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Abstract
This paper introduces a model of inequality aversion that captures a preference
for equality of ex-ante expected payo relative to a preference for equality of ex-post
payo by a single parameter. On deterministic allocations, the model reduces to the
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The model provides a unied explanation for
recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games and dictator games under veil of
ignorance. Moreover, the model can describe experiments on a preference for eciency,
which seem inconsistent with inequality aversion. We also apply the model to the
optimal tournament. Finally, we provide a behavioral foundation of the model.
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1 Introduction
Consider two drifters X and Y on a solitary island far out at sea. Unexpectedly, X nds a
plank with which only one of them can escape from the island. Y proposes \We should use
a fty-fty lottery to decide which of us gets to use the plank." Only X knows where the
plank is, so he gets the plank by rejecting Y's oer. However, rejecting the oer makes X
feel guilty. From an ex-ante viewpoint, the lottery gives each drifter an equal probability of
getting the plank. However, from an ex-post viewpoint, the lottery may make X feel envy
if Y uses the plank. Should X accept Y's oer ?
1
2
1
2
p:
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
Figure 1: The fty-fty lottery (1 denotes getting the plank and 0 denotes not getting it)
This example shows that an individual has a preference for two distinct notions of equal-
ity: equality of opportunity (i.e., equality of ex-ante expected payo) and equality of outcome
(i.e., equality of ex-post payo). The individual could face a trade-o between them, espe-
cially when his ex-post payo may be inferior to others' ex-post payo.
In the literature on social preferences, many theories have been proposed on inequality
aversion of an individual but most of them study deterministic environments.1 As Fuden-
berg and Levine (2011) point out, \leading theories of outcome-based social preferences,
. . . , fail to reect concerns for ex-ante fairness."2 In social choice literature, several papers
have studied the trade-o between the two notions of equality.3 However, they focus on
an impartial social planner; much less attention has been devoted to the study of a partial
individual who might feel envy or guilt, which seems more relevant to recent experimental
1See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2005) for surveys on models of inequality aversion in
deterministic environments.
2Ex-ante fairness corresponds to what we call equality of opportunity
3See Diamond (1967), Machina (1989), and Gajdos and Maurin (2004) for examples.
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evidence that shows equality of opportunity is often a concern for an individual. For in-
stance, in experiments on probabilistic dictator games, where subjects were asked to allocate
probabilities to win an indivisible good with a passive recipient, Karni et al. (2008), Bohnet
et al. (2008), Kircher et al. (2009), and Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) found that a
considerable number of subjects shared the probability to win equally.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a step toward lling this gap by proposing a
model of inequality aversion of an individual under risk that captures both a preference for
equality of opportunity and a preference for equality of outcome. We call it the expected
inequality-averse (EIA) model. We show that the EIA model is consistent with various
recent experimental evidence. Then, we apply the model to investigate the optimal tourna-
ment, where agents are inequality-averse. Finally, we provide a behavioral foundation for
the model.
In the EIA model, the decision maker's preference is represented by the following func-
tion: For a lottery p on allocations (x1; :::; xn) of material payos among n individuals,
V (p) =  U
 
Ep(x1); :::; Ep(xn)

+ (1  ) Ep
 
U(x1; :::; xn)

; (1)
where  2 [0; 1] and Ep is the expectation operator with respect to p.4 In addition, U
is the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999): U(y1; :::; yn) = y1  
Pn
i=2(imaxfyi   y1; 0g +
imaxfy1   yi; 0g), where y1 denotes the payo of the decision maker and yi denotes the
payo of individual i. U captures inequality aversion as follows: for each i 6= 1, the term
multiplied i captures the disutility of envy when the decision maker's payo is smaller than
individual i's payo; the term multiplied i captures the disutility of guilt when his payo
is larger than individual i's payo. All of the parameters ; , and  are unique and can be
identied experimentally.
In the EIA model, the rst term represents a preference for equality of opportunity be-
cause the term captures inequality aversion in the ex-ante expected payos (i.e., (Ep(x1); :::; Ep(xn)))
and, in contrast, the second term represents a preference for equality of outcome because
4Let p be a lottery that yields an allocation (xs1; :::; x
s
n) with probability s for each s 2 f1; :::;mg. Then,
Ep(xi) = 1x
1
i +   + mxmi and Ep
 
U(x1; :::; xn)

= 1U(x
1
1; :::; x
1
n) +   + mU(xm1 ; :::; xmn ).
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the term captures inequality aversion in the ex-post payos (i.e., (x1; :::; xn)). Therefore, the
relative weight  between the rst and the second terms captures a preference for equality
of opportunity relative to a preference for equality of outcome.
To demonstrate the tractability of the EIA model, reconsider the example of the two
drifters. Assume that X's preference is represented by the EIA model. Then, X's utility of
the fty-fty lottery (i.e., p in Figure 1) is
V (p) = 
1
2
+ (1  )
h1
2
( ) + 1
2
(1  )
i
: (2)
The lottery p gives the equal expected payo
1
2
to both, which is captured by the rst term.
However, ex-post allocations are not equal, so X could suer from either envy when Y gets
the plank or guilt when X gets the plank with equal probability. This is captured by the
second term. Therefore, X accepts the lottery p (i.e., V (p) > V (1; 0)) if and only if the
weight on equality of opportunity is high enough, or  >
1 +   
 + 
.
Notice that this example of the two drifters is similar in spirit to the experiments on
probabilistic dictator games, where subjects are asked to allocate probabilities to win an
indivisible good, such as the plank in the example. By nding conditions on the parameters
in a similar way, we show that the EIA model is consistent with the experiments. We also
show that the EIA model is consistent with an experiment by Kariv and Zame (2009) on
dictator games under a veil of ignorance.
Then, we apply the EIA model to describe experimental evidence for a preference for
eciency (i.e., maximizing the sum of payos across individuals), which seems inconsistent
with inequality aversion. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) found that in a dictator
game, almost 50% of 80 subjects preferred an ecient but unequal allocation (where the
dictator received 375 points and the receiver received 750 points) to an equal but inecient
allocation (where both subjects received 400 points).5 However, the EIA model can describe
both a preference for eciency and inequality aversion consistently by taking into account
the fact that in the experiments, each subject makes a decision as if he were a dictator, but
5See Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2006) for other examples.
4
the actual roles (i.e., dictator or recipient) are assigned at random after the decision. Under
this role-assignment risk, choosing an ecient but unequal allocation can be compatible
with equality of opportunity because other subjects also have the same chance to choose
the same unequal allocation.
Moreover, we apply the EIA model to the optimal tournament of a rm in which em-
ployees are inequality-averse among them. We show that in contrast to the standard model,
when  < 1 the rm cannot make the wage dierences between the winner and the loser
large enough to implement the employees' ecient eort because of their inequality aver-
sion and participation constraints. However, as the employees' concerns about equality of
opportunity become larger (i.e.,  approaches 1), the rm can make the wage dierences
larger to implement the ecient eort while keeping the participation constraints. This is
because in any equilibrium both employees exert the same eort level so that both have the
equal opportunity to be the winner. Hence, as  approaches 1, the employees' disutilities of
inequality aversion vanish.
We conclude the paper by providing behavioral conditions that characterize the EIA
model.6 We introduce a novel condition, the dominance condition, which states that if p is
preferred to q in both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, then p should be
preferred to q. In addition to this key condition, we also assume a weaker version of the (von
Neumann-Morgenstern risk) independence axiom because the original independence axiom
implies no preference for equality of opportunity (i.e., the special case of the EIA model
where  = 0). This implication is consistent with Fudenberg and Levine's (2011) main
result that the original independence axiom is incompatible with a preference for equality
of opportunity.7
6There are two related axiomatic papers. Rohde (2010) characterized the model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). Since Rohde (2010) studied a deterministic environment, she does not consider the trade-o between
the two notions of equality, which is the main issue in our paper. Independently of Rohde (2010), we
obtained the characterization of the model of Fehr and Schmidt. Subsequently and independently to our
paper, Borah (2011) characterized a preference for procedural fairness. In his model, the utility of an ex-
post allocation realized through a lottery is a weighted sum of the utility of the ex-post allocation and the
utility of the marginal distribution of the lottery. (Our paper has circulated since January 2007. A later
version of the paper has been available as COE Discussion Paper No. F-217 at the University of Tokyo
(http://www2.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cemano/ research/ DP/dp.html) since January 2008.)
7Based on this result, Fudenberg and Levine (2011) claim that \leading theories of outcome-based social
preferences for fairness, those of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the EIA model
formally and show its uniqueness. In Section 3 we show the consistency of the EIA model
with the the aforementioned experiments. In Section 4 we apply the EIA model to the
optimal tournament. In Section 5 we provide a behavioral foundation: a characterization of
the EIA model is in Section 5.1 and a characterization of the parameters is in Section 5.2.
Finally in Section 6, we provide a conclusion. We provide proofs in the text in Sections 3,
4, and 5.2. The other proofs are in the appendix.
2 The EIA Model
We assume that the set of (material) payos is R. Let I = f1; :::; ng be the set of individuals
and let 1 denote the decision maker. A vector x = (x1; :::; xn) in Rn is called an allocation of
payos among the individuals. The set of probability distributions over the allocations with
nite supports is denoted by (Rn). An element in (Rn) is called a lottery on allocations.
For any p 2 (Rn), Ep is the expectation operator with respect to p.8
Denition: An expected inequality-averse (EIA) model with a triple (; ; ) of vectors
;  2 Rn 1+ and  2 [0; 1] is a function V on (Rn) such that
V (p) =  U
 
Ep(x )

+ (1  ) Ep
 
U(x )

;
where U(y ) = y1 
Pn
i=2(imaxfyi y1; 0g+imaxfy1 yi; 0g). If a preference is represented
by V , the preference is called an EIA preference.9
Proposition 1 The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Two EIA models with (; ; ) and (0; 0; 0) represent the same preference on (Rn).
(ii) (; ) = (0; 0) and if (; ) 6= 0 then  = 0 .
In the case of interest, where the decision maker cares about inequality (i.e., where
Rabin (2002), Cox and Sadiraj (2004), and Andreoni and Miller (2002) all fail to reect concerns for ex-ante
fairness because they are expected utility theories."
8If p is a lottery that yields allocation x s = (xs1; ; :::; x
s
n) with probability s for each s 2 f1; :::;mg, then
Ep(x ) = 1x
1 +   + mxm = (1x11 +   + mxm1 ; :::; 1x1n +   + mxmn ). In addition, for any function
f : Rn ! R, Ep(f(x )) = 1f(x 1) +   + mf(xm).
9The representation can be extended to allow for risk aversion.
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(; ) 6= 0), the triple of parameters (; ; ) is unique.
3 Consistency with Experiments
We focus on experiments that involve risks because the EIA model reduces to the model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the deterministic allocations. It is well known that the model
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can describe various experiments that do not involve risks.
Moreover, we focus on stochastic versions of dictator games because these games provide
the cleanest test for the model.10
To describe the risks involved in the experiments, we dene a probability mixture to be
a lottery on allocations and denote the mixture by  as follows:
Denition: For all  2 [0; 1] and p; q 2 (Rn), p  (1   )q 2 (Rn) is a lottery on
allocations such that (p (1  )q)(x ) = p(x ) + (1  )q(x ) 2 [0; 1] for each x 2 Rn.11
For example, p in Figure 1 corresponds to probability mixture
1
2
(1; 0) 1
2
(0; 1).
3.1 Probabilistic Dictator Games
First, we discuss the experimental results in probabilistic dictator games, where dictators
allocate probabilities to win an indivisible good. In such experiments, it is observed that
a substantial fraction of dictators shared the probability of winning. For example, Kircher
et al. (2009) asked 60 subjects to choose among receiving 1 euro, donating 1 euro to Red
Cross, or randomizing between the two with equal probability. Kircher et al. (2009) found
that 25% of the subjects chose the equal randomization.12 See Karni et al. (2008), Bohnet
et al. (2008), and Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) for similar experimental evidence.
To see that this experimental nding is consistent with the EIA model, consider a dictator
whose preference is represented by the EIA model. The dictator chooses a probability
r 2 [0; 1] that he receives the indivisible good ex post. Since the recipient receives the
good with the rest of the probability 1  r, the dictator obtains probability mixture p(r) =
10The dictator games perfectly t the framework of a single-person decision-making problem and do not
involve non-distributional concerns such as reciprocity.
11For degenerate lotteries on allocations, we write x  (1  )y 2 (Rn), instead of x  (1  )y .
12In a similar experiment with 92 subjects, Kircher et al. (2009) also found that almost 30% of the
subjects randomized with equal probability.
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r(1; 0) (1  r)(0; 1).13 Thus, the utility by choosing r is 14
V
 
p(r)

=
8<: 
 
r   (1  2r)+ (1  ) r(1  ) + (1  r)( ) if r  1
2
;

 
r   (2r   1)+ (1  ) r(1  ) + (1  r)( ) if r  1
2
:
(3)
Under the commonly used assumption that disutility from envy is larger than that from
guilt (i.e.,  > ), the optimal probability r (i.e., the maximizer of (3)) is characterized as
follows.15
Proposition 2 Suppose that  > . The optimal probability is
r =
8><>:
1
2
if   1 +   
 + 
;
1 if   1 +   
 + 
:
Proof : Since  > , it is easy to see that r  1
2
is not optimal. For any r 2 [1
2
; 1], dene
f(r)  V (p(r)) = (+) +(1+  (+))r. By the linearity of f , the candidates
for the maximizers are r = 1
2
or r = 1. In addition, f(1
2
) > f(1), 1
2
[1  (1  )( + )] >
1   ,  > 1+ 
+
. 
Therefore, the dictator shares the probability of winning if and only if   1 +   
+ 
.
Given the values of  and  that are often assumed in the literature, the condition is
compatible with  2 [0; 1].16
3.2 Dictator Games under a Veil of Ignorance
Next, we investigate Kariv and Zame's (2009) experiments. In their experiments, subjects
are asked to divide payo 1 into x and y such that x + qy  1, where q  1. After
the decision, the material payos of the decision maker and the recipient are determined
13This specication of the allocation is without loss of generality. We can obtain the same result with x
and y such that x > y, instead of 1 and 0.
14By denition, V (p(r)) = 
 
r  maxf1  2r; 0g   maxf2r  1; 0g+ (1  ) r(1  ) + (1  r)( ).
A direct calculation shows the equation for each case.
15The assumption  >  is common in the literature. See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2006).
16For  = 1 and  = 0:6, which are assumed for 30 percent of the population by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
the condition is equivalent to   0:875. For  = 2 and  = 0:6, which are assumed for 10 percent of the
population by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the condition is equivalent to   0:93.
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to be x or y with probability
1
2
. Thus, the decision maker obtains probability mixture
1
2
(x; y) 1
2
(y; x). In other words, the subjects are required to decide an allocation under a
veil of ignorance.
Kariv and Zame (2009) found that the mode of the distribution of x is around x =
1
1 + q
,
which corresponds to dividing the payo equally. The distribution falls o sharply from the
mode but has a mass (about 7%) at x = 1. To see that the EIA model can describe these
two major choices x =
1
1 + q
and x = 1, note that the utility of the fty-fty probability
mixture is17
V
1
2
(x; y) 1
2
(y; x)

=
1
2
h
(x+ y)  (1  )( + )jx  yj
i
: (4)
Hence, the optimal allocation (x; y) (i.e., the maximizer of (4)) is characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 The optimal allocation is
(x; y) =
8><>:
(1; 0) if   1  q   1
( + )(q + 1)
; 1
1 + q
;
1
1 + q

if   1  q   1
( + )(q + 1)
:
Proof : Since V is monotonic on equal allocations, the budget constraint is binding in
the optimal allocation.18 By the substitution of x = 1   qy, the utility by choosing y is
V (1
2
(1   qy; y)  1
2
(y; 1   qy)) = 1
2
[1 + (1   q)y   (1   )( + )j1   (1 + q)yj]. Dene
f(y)  V (1
2
(1   qy; y)  1
2
(y; 1   qy)). Since q  1, y > 1
1+q
is not optimal. By the
linearity of f , the candidates for the maximizers are y = 0 or y = 1
1+q
. In addition,
f(0) > f( 1
1+q
), 1
2
[1  (1  )( + )] > 1
1+q
,  > 1  q 1
(+)(q+1)
. 
3.3 Preference for Eciency
Third, we investigate a preference for eciency under role-assignment risk. Several experi-
mental research has found an evidence for a preference for eciency, which seems inconsis-
17The derivation is as follows: V ( 12 (x; y) 12 (y; x)) =  12 (x+y)+(1 )[ 12 (x maxfy x; 0g maxfx 
y; 0g) + 12 (y   maxfx  y; 0g   maxfy   x; 0g)] = 12 [(x+ y)  (1  )(+ )jx  yj].
18V (x; : : : ; x)  V (y; : : : ; y), x  y.
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tent with inequality aversion. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) have found that in
a dictator game under role-assignment risk, almost 50% of 80 subjects preferred an ecient
but unequal allocation to an equal but inecient allocation. (See Engelmann and Strobel
(2004, 2006) for other examples.)
We consider two versions of dictator games where a dictator can choose between an
ecient (but unequal) allocation or an equal (but inecient) allocation: in one version of
the dictator game, the ecient allocation is an altruistic allocation and in the other version,
the ecient allocation is a selsh allocation. Then, assuming mild assumptions on the
parameters, we show that under role-assignment risk, a subject who has an EIA preference
can choose the altruistic allocation in one game and the selsh allocation in the other game
but without role-assignment risk he always chooses the equal allocation over those ecient
allocations.
The games are formally dened as follows. We consider two players 1 and 2 who have
EIA preferences. In game I, the players make a choice between an altruistic allocation and
an equal allocation under role-assignment risk. If a player chooses the altruistic allocation
and becomes a dictator, then his payo is 0 and and the other player's payo is x > 2. In
contrast, if a player chooses an equal allocation and becomes a dictator, then both players'
payos are 1.19 Note that since x > 2, the altruistic allocation is more ecient than the
equal allocation.
Due to role-assignment risk, in fact, each player obtains a fty-fty lottery over allo-
cations. For example, if player 1 chooses the altruistic allocation (i.e., (0; x)) and player
2 chooses the equal allocation (i.e., (1; 1)), then both players obtain probability mixture
1
2
(0; x) 1
2
(1; 1), where the rst and the second coordinates of the proles show the mate-
rial payos of players 1 and 2, respectively. Hence, game I is illustrated in Figure 2, where
A denotes choosing the altruistic allocation and E denotes choosing the equal allocation.
Game II is the same as game I except for the point that each player can choose a selsh
allocation, instead of the altruistic allocation. If a player chooses the selsh allocation and
becomes a dictator, then his payo is x > 2 and the other player's payo is 0. Since x > 2,
19This specication of allocation is without loss of generality. We can obtain the same result with y
instead of 1 and z instead of 0 such that x > y > z.
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1
2
(0; x) 1
2
(x; 0)
1
2
(0; x) 1
2
(1; 1)
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(x; 0)
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(1; 1)
A
E A
E
E
A
1
2
Game I
1
2
(x; 0) 1
2
(0; x)
1
2
(x; 0) 1
2
(1; 1)
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(0; x)
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(1; 1)
S
E S
E
E
S
1
2
Game II
Figure 2: Dictator games with role-assignment risk
the selsh allocation is more ecient than the equal allocation. Game II is also illustrated
in Figure 2, where S denotes choosing the selsh allocation.
Games I' and II' are the same as games I and II, respectively, except for the point that
there is no role-assignment risk. Thus, in games I' and II' only one player's choice determines
the allocation as illustrated in Figure 3, where player 1 is a dictator for sure.
(1; 1)
(0; x)
A
E
1
Game I'
(1; 1)
(x; 0)
S
E
1
Game II'
Figure 3: Dictator games without role-assignment risk
Proposition 4 Suppose that  >  and 1 > .20 Then, for any payo x such that
( + )    1
x
 1  ; (5)
the following results hold:21
(i) In game I, both subjects choose the altruistic allocation in an equilibrium.
(ii) In game II, both subjects choose the selsh allocation in an equilibrium.
(iii) In games I' and II', choosing the equal allocation is dominant.22
20The assumptions  >  and 1 >  are common in the literature. See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999, 2006).
21Under the assumption that  > 12 , x that satises (5) and x > 2 exists if and only if (+)   1 .
22In (i) and (ii), there is the other symmetric pure equilibrium where both choose the equal allocation.
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Proof : By a direct calculation, (iii) holds if 1 > x(1   ). To show (i) and (ii), we
denote by i(sijsj) the utility of player i when his strategy is si and the strategy of player
j is sj. Then, 1(AjA) = V
 
1
2
(0; x)  1
2
(x; 0)

= 1
2
x[1   (1   )( + )], 1(EjA) =
V
 
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(x; 0)

= 1
2
[1+x(1 )], 1(SjS) = V
 
1
2
(x; 0) 1
2
(0; x)

= 1
2
x[1 (1 )(+)],
and 1(EjS) = V
 
1
2
(1; 1)  1
2
(0; x)

= 1
2
(1   x). Since the game is symmetric across the
players, i(AjA) > i(EjA) if and only if ((+) )x > 1. Similarly, i(SjS) > i(EjS)
if and only if ((+ )   +1)x > 1. Since  > , ((+ )   +1)x > ((+ )  )x.
Therefore, (i), (ii), and (iii) hold if ( + )    1
x
 1  . 
As (iii) states, in games I' and II' without role-assignment risk, the dictator always
chooses the equal allocation over both the altruistic allocation and the selsh allocation.
However with role-assignment risk, the same dictator can choose the altruistic allocation
in game I and the selsh allocation in game II. Therefore, if an experimenter did not take
into consideration role-assignment risk in these games, the observed behavior would look
inconsistent with inequality aversion and consistent only with a preference for eciency.
To understand this result intuitively, note that role-assignment risk has an eect similar
to that of a veil of ignorance. Suppose that each of the two players decides to allocate x to
himself and y to the other. Then, under role-assignment risk, the utility of each subject is
determined as (4); that is,
V
1
2
(x; y) 1
2
(y; x)

=
1
2
h
(\eciency")  (1  )( + )(\inequality")
i
:
Hence, the subject's utility from choosing the ecient allocation can be larger than his
utility from choosing the equal allocation, provided that he weighs equality of opportunity
heavily enough (i.e.,  is large enough) and the other player chooses the same ecient
allocation.
Finally, we stress that our explanation is only one possible hypothesis and does not deny
the importance of a preference for eciency. However, in three-person voting games, Bolton
This is not inconsistent with our main claim in this section: with role-assignment risk, the choices of dictators
are unstable (i.e., choosing the equal allocation is not dominant and there is an equilibrium where both
players choose the ecient allocation); in contrast, without role-assignment risk, the choices are stable (i.e.,
choosing the equal allocation is dominant).
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and Ockenfels (2006) found experimentally that a preference for eciency is signicantly
mitigated without role-assignment risk.23 This evidence would imply that, as Proposition 4
suggests, part of the preference for eciency under role-assignment risk would be driven by
a preference for equality of opportunity.
4 Application to Optimal Tournament
In this section, we investigate the optimal tournament of a rm with two employees. We
assume that the employees i and j are inequality-averse between them and their preferences
are represented by the EIA model. We show that in contrast to the standard model by
Lazer and Rosen (1981), when  < 1 the rm cannot implement the employees' ecient
eort.24 However, as  approaches 1, the rm can asymptotically implement the ecient
eort.
The rm chooses wage w1 for the winner and wage w2 for the loser to maximize the
sum of the employees' productions. The employees compete in their quantity of production.
The production of employee k 2 fi; jg is qk(ek) = ek + "k, where ek is his eort level and "k
is an exogenous random shock. Let G and g be the distribution function and the density
function of "i   "j. We assume that "i and "j are independently and identically distributed
and g(0) > 0. Then g(x) = g( x).
The probability that employee i wins is pi(ei; ej)  Prfqi(ei) > qj(ej)g = G(ei   ej).
Hence, when the pair of eort levels is (ei; ej), employee i obtains probability mixture
pi(ei; ej)(w1; w2)  (1   pi(ei; ej))(w2; w1). Given (w1; w2) and ej, employee i chooses ei to
maximize V (pi(ei; ej)(w1; w2) (1  pi(ei; ej))(w2; w1))  e2i ; where e2i is the cost of eort.
Remark 1 Suppose   . Given (w1; w2), in any pure strategy equilibrium, both employees
choose an identical eort level e1 = e2 = e such that wg(0)((1 2)+(1 )(1 +)) 
2e  wg(0)((1  2) + (1  )(1   + )), where w = w1   w2.
Proof : First, we show ei = ej in any pure strategy equilibrium. Without loss of generality,
23Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2006) also found that, in dierent games, the
percentage of choices of ecient allocations decreases without role-assignment risk, although the decreases
are not signicant.
24Grund and Sliwka (2005) studied the case where  = 0.
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assume ei  ej. Then pi  12  pj and the utility of employee i is (w2 + piw   (2pi  
1)w) + (1   )(w2   w + piw(1 +    ))   e2i and the utility of employee j is
(w2 + pjw   (1   2pj)w) + (1   )(w2   w + pjw(1 +    ))   e2j . By the
rst order conditions, 0 = (dpi
dei
w   2 dpi
dei
w) + (1   )(dpi
dei
w(1 +    ))   2ei and
0 = (
dpj
dej
w + 2
dpj
dej
w) + (1   )(dpj
dej
w(1 +    ))   2ej. By the symmetry, dpidei =
g(ei   ej) = g(ej   ei) = dpjdej . We obtain 2(ei   ej) =  2( + )wg(ei   ej)  0. Hence,
ej  ei. Therefore, in any pure strategy equilibrium, ei = ej.
Next, we check incentives to deviate from (e; e). Individual i has no incentive to increase
his eort at (e; e) if (g(0)w   2g(0)w) + (1   )(g(0)w(1    + ))   2e  0.
Similarly, he has no incentive to decrease his eort at (e; e) if ( g(0)w   2g(0)w) +
(1   )( g(0)w(1    + )) + 2e  0. Given (w1; w2), therefore, (ei; ej) is a pair of
best responses if and only if w g(0)((1   2) + (1   )(1    + ))  2ei = 2ej 
wg(0)((1  2) + (1  )(1   + )). 
Given (w1; w2), equilibrium eort levels of both employees must be the same but there are
multiple best-response eort levels because of the kink of the EIA model. In the following,
we select two equilibria where the eort level is highest (i.e., 2e = wg(0)((1  2) + (1 
)(1  +))) or lowest (i.e., 2e = wg(0)((1  2)+ (1  )(1  +))).25 Since higher
eort implies higher prot of the rm and lower utility of the employees, the high eort
equilibrium is the best equilibrium for the rm and the low eort equilibrium is the best
equilibrium for the employees.26 We show that both equilibria have the same properties in
comparative statics with respect to .
In an equilibrium, (w1; w2; e) must maximize the rm's expected prot: E[qi(e; e) +
qj(e; e)] w1 w2 = 2e  2w2 w+E("i)+E("j) subject to the employee's participation
constraint:
0  V
1
2
(w1; w2) 1
2
(w2; w1)

  e2 = w2 + 1
2
w(1  (1  )( + ))  e2
25We assume the standard assumption that   .
26The high eort equilibrium would arise as a focal point through the inuence of the rm. The low eort
equilibrium would arise as a result of coordination among the employees.
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and the incentive rationality constraint: 2e = wg(0)((1  2)+ (1  )(1 +)) in the
high eort equilibrium and 2e = wg(0)((1   2) + (1   )(1    + )) in the low eort
equilibrium, respectively.
Proposition 5 Let 1
2
    and  > 0. In both equilibria, the following results hold:
Suppose  +  = 0, then the eort level is ecient (i.e., 1
2
).
Suppose  +  > 0, then (i) the eort level is smaller than the ecient level if  < 1 ,
(ii) the eort level is increasing in  and tends to be ecient as  approaches 1 (i.e., e! 1
2
as  ! 1), and (iii) the wage dierences w is increasing in .
Proof : In any equilibrium, the participation constraint is satised with equality: w2(e) =
 1
2
(1   (1   )( + ))w(e) + e2. In addition, w(e) is determined by the incentive
constraints in both equilibria: w(e) = 2e
(1 2)+(1 )(1 +) in the high eort equilibrium
and w(e) = 2e
(1 2)+(1 )(1 +) in the low eort equilibrium. Since   , w(e) is
increasing in  in both equilibria, if e is increasing in .
The rm's problem is maxe 2e 2w2(e) w(e)+E("i)+E("j). The rst order condition
is 0 = 2   4e   (1   )( + )(w)0(e). Therefore, e = 1
2
  1
4
(1   )( + )(w)0(e).
Since (w)00(e) = 0, the second order condition is satised. Therefore, the equilibrium
eort level is e = 1
2
  +
2g(0)
1

1  (1 2)+(1 +)
in the high eort equilibrium and e = 1
2
 
+
2g(0)
1

1  (1 2)+(1 +)
in the low eort equilibrium. Since 1
2
   , 
1  is increasing in ,
and 
1  !1 as  ! 1, the results in Proposition 5 hold. 
As Lazer and Rosen (1981) have shown, if employees are not inequality-averse (i.e.,
 = 0 = ), the equilibrium eort is ecient (i.e., e = 1
2
). However, when they are
inequality-averse and  < 1, as (i) states, the equilibrium eort level is smaller than the
ecient level. To understand this result intuitively, note that as the incentive constraints in
both equilibria show, implementing higher eort requires larger wage dierences w. The
larger wage dierences in turn implies a higher disutility caused by the inequality. Since the
rm must compensate the disutility by making w2 higher, it can be too costly to implement
the ecient eort level in the equilibria.
However, as Remark 1 shows, in any equilibrium, the employees' eort levels are the
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same, so that the payo distribution 1
2
(w1; w2) 12(w2; w1) is equal in opportunity. Therefore
the disutility caused by inequality aversion vanishes as  increases. Hence, as (iii) states,
the rm can make the wage dierences larger as  increases to implement higher eort while
keeping the participation constraints. As a result, as (ii) states, the equilibrium eort level
tends to be ecient, as  approaches 1.
The implication of Proposition 5 might suggest an explanation of the divergence in
the wage systems between the United States and Western Europe: the wage dierences
in the United States are larger than those in Western Europe.27 A recent meta-analysis
by Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen (2004) have suggested no signicant dierence in
deterministic inequality aversion (i.e.,  and ) between the two regions.28
The EIA model could still explain the divergence in the wage systems by taking into
account the dierence in a preference for equality of opportunity (i.e., ). One explanation
that is consistent with Proposition 5 (iii) is that Americans are more concerned about
equality of opportunity than Western Europeans (i.e.,  is higher in the United States than
in Western Europe). In other words, inequality of outcome (i.e., larger wage dierences) as a
result of fair competition is more acceptable in the United States than in Western Europe.29
5 Behavioral Foundation
The primitive preference % is on (Rn). As usual,  and  denote the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of %, respectively.30
5.1 Characterization of the EIA Model
The following ve conditions characterize the EIA model. The rst condition is standard.
Condition (Rationality): % is complete, transitive, continuous, and monotonic in equal
allocations (i.e., (x; :::; x) % (y; :::; y) if and only if x  y).31
27See Bertola and Ichino (1995) for the evidence.
28Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen (2004) found no signicant dierence in both oered shares and
rejection rates between Western Europe and the Eastern United States by conducting a meta-analysis of 37
papers on ultimatum game experiments.
29This explanation is also consistent with the empirical evidence that Americans work more than Western
Europeans. See Prescott (2004) for the evidence.
30For all x; x0 2 R, we write x % x0 instead of (x; :::; x) % (x0; :::; x0), when there is no danger of confusion.
31The continuity assumed here is von Neumann-Morgenstern continuity with respect to outcome mixtures
16
The next condition captures envy and guilt respectively. In the condition, we denote by
(x; (y) i) the allocation that gives payo x only to individual i and gives payo y to the
other individuals.
Condition (Inequality Aversion): For all i 6= 1, (0; (0) i) % (1; (0) i) and (0; (0) i) %
( 1; (0) i).
To provide a weaker version of the independence axiom, we dene an outcome mixture
of allocations as follows. Note that we denote outcome mixtures using +, not .
Denition: For all  2 [0; 1] and x ;y 2 Rn, x + (1   )y 2 Rn is an allocation such
that x + (1  )y = (x1 + (1  )y1; :::; xn + (1  )yn).
Inequality-averse preferences may violate the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) independence
axiom. For example, a violation often observed in (two-person) dictator games is as follows:
1
2
(1; 0)+ 1
2
(0; 1)  (1
2
; 1
2
)  (1; 0) % (0; 1).32 The source of the violation here is the fact that
in the mixed allocations, the rankings of the payos are opposite (i.e., the other individual
is better o in (0; 1) and worse o in (1; 0) than the decision maker).
We want to assume the independence axiom when such reversals do not occur.
Denition: Two allocations x ;y 2 Rn are said to be quasi-comonotonic if there is no i 6= 1
such that xi > x1 and yi < y1. (Remember that 1 2 I denotes the decision maker.)
If x and y are quasi-comonotonic, then the rankings of payos of any individual with
respect to the decision maker are not reversed between x and y .33
Condition (Outcome Quasi-comonotonic Independence): For all  2 (0; 1] and x ;y ; z 2
Rn such that the pairs x ; z , and y ; z are each quasi-comonotonic,
and probability mixtures. Formally, (i) for all x ;y ; z 2 Rn, if x  y and y  z , then there exist  and 
in (0; 1) such that x + (1  )z  y and y  x + (1  )z ; and (ii) for all p; q; r 2 (Rn), if p  q and
q  r, then there exist  and  in (0; 1) such that p (1  )r  q and q  p (1  )r.
32Suppose that % satises the independence axiom. Then (1; 0)%(0; 1) implies (1; 0)  12 (1; 0)+ 12 (1; 0)%
1
2 (1; 0) +
1
2 (0; 1)  ( 12 ; 12 ). This contradicts with ( 12 ; 12 )  (1; 0).
33The denition is a weaker version of comonotonicity provided by Schmeidler (1989). Schmeidler (1989,
p. 586) has presented an interpretation of comonotonicity from the viewpoint of a social planner's inequality
aversion as follows: two allocations x and y are comonotonic if the social rank of any two individuals is
not reversed between x and y . When we focus on an individual's inequality-averse preferences, what is
relevant to the individual is social rank with respect to the individual himself, not the social rank of any two
individuals.
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x % y ,  x + (1  )z % y + (1  )z :
These three conditions are enough to obtain the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on
the restricted domain Rn (i.e., the set of degenerate lotteries on allocations).34
Just as outcome mixtures may change the rankings of ex-post payos, probability mix-
tures may change the rankings of ex-ante expected payos. However, probability mixtures
with an equal allocation (x; :::; x) should not change any rankings. This suggests the follow-
ing condition:
Condition (Probability Certainty Independence): For all  2 (0; 1], p; q 2 (Rn), and
x 2 R,
p % q , p (1  )(x; :::; x) % q  (1  )(x; :::; x):
Under the above conditions, for any allocation x , it will be shown that there uniquely
exists z 2 R such that (z; :::; z)  x . Such payo z is denoted by e(x ) and is called an
equality equivalent. The value e(x ) reects the equality of allocation x .
The nal key condition, dominance, states that if p is preferred to q in both equality of
opportunity and equality of outcome, then p should be preferred to q. To show the condition,
we formalize the two notions of equality by using equality equivalents. Let p = 1x
1  
mx
m. Then, Ep(x ) = (
Pm
i=1 ix
i
1; :::;
Pm
i=1 ix
i
n) is the expected allocation in p. Therefore
e(Ep(x )) reects the evaluation of p in terms of equality of opportunity. In contrast, since
each e(x i) reects the equality of outcome x i, Ep(e(x )) = 1e(x
1) +   + me(xm) is the
expected evaluation of p in terms of equality of outcome.
Condition (Dominance): For all p; q 2 (Rn),8<: (i) e(Ep(x ))  e(Eq(x ))(ii) Ep(e(x ))  Eq(e(x ))
1A) p % q:
To demonstrate how to use the dominance condition, let p = 1
2
(1; 1)  1
2
(0; 0) and q =
1
2
(1; 0) 1
2
(0; 1). On one hand, Ep(x ) = (
1
2
; 1
2
) = Eq(x ), so that e(Ep(x )) =
1
2
= e(Eq(x )).
Hence, p and q are indierent in equality of opportunity. On the other hand, to evaluate the
34See Lemma 1 in the appendix for the statement.
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1
2
1
2
q :
1
2
(1; 0) 1
2
(0; 1) =
(0; 1)
(1; 0)1
2
1
2
p :
1
2
(1; 1) 1
2
(0; 0) =
(0; 0)
(1; 1)
(i) e(Ep(x )) = e(
1
2
; 1
2
) e(Eq(x )) = e(
1
2
; 1
2
)
(ii) Ep(e(x )) =
1
2
e(1; 1) + 1
2
e(0; 0) Eq(e(x )) =
1
2
e(1; 0) + 1
2
e(0; 1)
Figure 4: Dominance
lotteries in equality of outcome, suppose that the decision maker is strictly inequality-averse
(i.e., (1; 1)  (1; 0) and (0; 0)  (0; 1)), so that 1 > e(1; 0) and 0 > e(0; 1). Since e(1; 1) = 1
and e(0; 0) = 0, it follows that Ep(e(x )) =
1
2
e(1; 1) + 1
2
e(0; 0) = 1
2
> 1
2
e(1; 0) + 1
2
e(0; 1) =
Eq(e(x )). Hence, p is preferred to q in equality of outcome. Therefore, the dominance
condition implies that the decision maker should prefer p to q.35
The above ve conditions are equivalent to an EIA model. Formally,
Theorem: % satises Rationality, Inequality Aversion, Outcome Quasi-comonotonic Inde-
pendence, Probability Certainty Independence, and Dominance if and only if there exists a
triple (; ; ) of vectors ;  2 Rn 1+ and  2 [0; 1] such that % is represented by
V (p) =  U
 
Ep(x )

+ (1  ) Ep
 
U(x )

;
where U(y ) = y1  
Pn
i=2(imaxfyi   y1; 0g+ imaxfy1   yi; 0g).
5.2 Characterizations of Parameters
We can identify the parameters easily by experiments:  and  are respectively identied
by nding i and i such that
( i; :::; i)  (1; (0) i) and ( i; :::; i)  ( 1; (0) i); (6)
35In contrast to the dominance condition, the reversal of order condition proposed by Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) does not take equality of outcome into consideration: the condition implies that if
e(Ep(x )) = e(Eq(x )) then p  q.
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for each i 2 I n f1g.36 After identifying  and , we can identify  by nding c such that
(c; :::; c)  1
2
(1; (0) i) 1
2
( 1; (0) i); (7)
for some i 2 I n f1g.37 Then, by the representation,  = 1 + 2c
i + i
. 38
In the following, we characterize the special cases of the EIA model with  = 1 and
 = 0.39 The next condition characterizes the special with  = 1. The condition states that
allocation (0; :::; 0) is indierent to a probability mixture whose ex-ante expected allocation
is (0; :::; 0).
Condition (Indierence to Timing of Mixture): For all i 6= 1,
(0; :::; 0)  1
2
(1; (0) i) 1
2
( 1; (0) i): (8)
The other special case with  = 0 has been used in several papers.40 This special case
is characterized by the condition that the decision maker does not have a strict preference
for probability mixtures.
Condition (Probability Mixture Neutrality): For all i 6= 1 and x; y 2 R such that x > 0 > y,
(x; (0) i)  (y; (0) i)) 1
2
(x; (0) i) 1
2
(y; (0) i)  (x; (0) i):
Proposition 6 Suppose % is represented by an EIA model with (; ; ) where (; ) 6= 0.
(i) % exhibits indierence to timing of mixture if and only if  = 1.
(ii) % exhibits probability mixture neutrality if and only if  = 0.
Proof : Assume i > 0 for some i 6= 1, without loss of generality. To prove (i), note
that V (1
2
(1; (0) i)  12( 1; (0) i)) =  12(1   )(i + i). Hence, (0; (0) i)  12(1; (0) i) 
36By inequality aversion, (0; (0) i)%(1; (0) i) and (0; (0) i)%( 1; (0) i). Hence, by monotonicity, i and
i are nonnegative. We use 1 and  1 just for simplicity. Instead of 1 and  1, we could use any real numbers
x and y such that x > y. In that case, x+y2 must be used instead of 0.
37Any i 6= 1 works.
38Given (7), the representation shows c =   12 (1  )(i+i). For inequality-averse subjects, it is natural
to assume (0; (0) i)%12 (1; (0) i) 12 ( 1; (0) i). Hence, under monotonicity, c is negative. Thus,   1.
39The characterization of  and  are similar and easier.
40For example, Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) used the special case.
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1
2
( 1; (0) i) ,  = 1, so that (i) holds. To prove (ii), choose any x; y 2 R such that x 
0  y and (x; (0) i)  (y; (0) i). Then, U(x; (0) i) =  ix and U(y; (0) i) = iy. Consider
the case where 1
2
x+ 1
2
y  0.41 Then V (1
2
(x; (0) i) 12(y; (0) i)) U(x; (0) i) = i 12(x y).
Hence, 1
2
(x; (0) i) 12(y; (0) i)  (x; (0) i),  = 0. For the other case where 12x+ 12y  0,
the result can be proved in the same way. 
The above proposition states that these two special cases have rather extreme impli-
cations for behavior. This would suggest that the generic case where  2 (0; 1) is more
relevant.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a model of inequality aversion of an individual under risk, which we
call the EIA model. Under risk, there are two distinct and sometimes incompatible notions
of equality, in contrast to a deterministic environment: equality of opportunity and equality
of outcome. In the EIA model, a single parameter  captures a preference for equality
of opportunity relative to a preference for equality of outcome. Furthermore, the model
reduces into the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the deterministic allocations. We have
applied the EIA model to provide a unied explanation for various experimental evidence,
including a preference for eciency. Moreover, we have applied the EIA model to the
optimal tournament and have shown that the eciency can be achieved as  ! 1 in spite of
inequality aversion. One underling insight suggested by these applications is that equality
of opportunity can often be compatible with eciency in contrast to equality of outcome.
Finally, we have provided behavioral conditions that characterize the EIA model.
Appendix: Proofs
Before proving the theorem, we show two independent lemmas. The rst lemma provides the
representation theorem of the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the restricted domain
Rn of the set of degenerate lotteries.
41In this case, V ( 12 (x; (0) i) 12 (y; (0) i)) =  i

1
2x+
1
2y
  (1  ) 12ix  iy.
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A Lemmas
Lemma 1 A preference % on Rn satises Rationality, Inequality Aversion, and Outcome
Quasi-Comonotonic Independence if and only if there exists a pair (; ) of vectors ;  2
Rn 1+ such that % on Rn is represented by U(x ) = x1 
Pn
i=2
 
imaxfxi x1; 0g+imaxfx1 
xi; 0g

.
Proof of Lemma 1: The necessity of the conditions is trivial. In the following, we show
the suciency. Fix % that satises the conditions.
Step 1: There exists a utility function U : Rn ! R such that (i) for all  2 [0; 1] and
x ;y 2 Rn, if x and y are quasi-comonotonic, then U(x+(1 )y ) = U(x )+(1 )U(y ),
(ii) for all x 2 Rn and a 2 R+, U(ax ) = aU(x ), and (iii) U is unique up to positive ane
transformation.
Proof of Step 1: Since an equal allocation (z; :::; z) is quasi-comonotonic with any other
allocations, Outcome Quasi-comonotonic Independence implies that for all x ;y 2 Rn, z 2
R, and  2 (0; 1), x % y , x +(1 )(z; :::; z) % y +(1 )(z; :::; z). By the standard
argument with the von Neumann-Morgenstern's Theorem, the above property implies that
there exists a utility function U on Rn such that for all x 2 Rn, z 2 R, and  2 (0; 1),
U(x + (1  )(z; :::; z)) = U(x ) + (1  )U(z; :::; z): (9)
In addition, U is unique up to positive ane transformation, so that (iii) holds. Hence,
we can normalize U by U(1; :::; 1) = 1 and U( 1; :::; 1) =  1, without loss of generality.
Then, U(0; :::; 0) = 0. Therefore, (9) shows that for all x 2 R and a 2 [0; 1] such that a  1,
U(ax ) = aU(x ). This immediately implies (ii).42
To show (i), choose  2 [0; 1] and x ;y 2 Rn such that x and y are quasi-comonotonic.
By (ii), there exists a positive integer n such that 1
n
U(x ) = U( 1
n
x ) 2 [ 1; 1]. Since [ 1; 1] 
fU(z; :::; z)jz 2 Rg, there exists z 2 R such that (z; :::; z)  1
n
x . In addition, 1
n
x and 1
n
y
are also quasi-comonotonic. Hence, Outcome Quasi-comonotonic Independence shows that
42Let a > 1 and x 2 R. Then, x  1a (ax ) +
 
1   1a

(0; :::; 0). Hence, U(x ) = 1aU(ax ), so that
U(ax ) = aU(x ).
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( 1
n
x ) + (1   )( 1
n
y )  (z; :::; z) + (1   )( 1
n
y ). Therefore, by using (9) and (ii), we
obtain 1
n
U(x + (1 )y  = U((z; :::; z) + (1 )( 1
n
y )) = U(z; :::; z) + (1 )U( 1
n
y ) =

 
1
n
U(x )

+ (1  )  1
n
U(y )

, so that (i) holds. 
For all i 6= 1, dene i =  U(1; (0) i) and i =  U( 1; (0) i). By Inequality Aversion,
i  0 and i  0 for all i 6= 1. Fix any x 2 Rn.
Step 2: Let I = fi 2 Ijxi > x1g and I = fi 2 Ijx1 > xig. Then, (i) for all i 2 I, U(xi  
x1; (0) i) =  imaxfxi   x1; 0g, (ii) for all i 2 I, U(xi   x1; (0) i) =  imaxfx1   xi; 0g,
and (iii) for all i 2 I n (I [ I), U(xi   x1; (0) i) = 0.
Proof of Step 2: To show (i), x i 2 I. By Step 1 (ii), U(xi   x1; (0) i) = (xi  
x1)U(1; (0) i) =  imaxfxi   x1; 0g. (ii) and (iii) can be proved in the same way. 
By the steps, the following calculations complete the proof of Lemma 1. Note that
1
n
x  1
n
(x1; :::; x1) +
Pn
i=2
1
n
(xi  x1; (0) i) and any pair among f(x1; :::; x1); (x2  x1; (0) 2)
; :::; (xn x1; (0) n)g is quasi-comonotonic. Therefore, U(x ) = nU( 1nx ) = nU( 1n(x1; :::; x1)+Pn
i=2
1
n
(xi   x1; (0) i)) = U(x1; :::; x1) +
Pn
i=2 U(xi   x1; (0) i) = x1  
Pn
i=2(imaxfxi  
x1; 0g+ imaxfx1   xi; 0g). 
Lemma 2 provides a representation result for a preference %^ on a subset set D of R2.
Condition (Certainty Monotonicity): (c; c) %^ (c0; c0) if and only if c  c0.
Condition (Certainty Independence): For all (a; b); (a0; b0); (c; c) 2 D and  2 [0; 1], (a; b)
%^ (a0; b0) if and only if (a; b) + (1  )(c; c) %^(a0; b0) + (1  )(c; c).
Condition (Certainty Continuity): For all (a; b); (a0; b0); (c; c) 2 D , if (a; b) %^ (a0; b0) %^ (c; c)
or (c; c) %^ (a0; b0) %^ (a; b) then there exists  2 [0; 1] such that (a0; b0) ^(a; b)+ (1 )(c; c).
Lemma 2 : Suppose that (i) for any (a; b) 2 D , a  b, (ii) for all (a; b); (c; c) 2 D and  2
[0; 1], (a; b)+(1 )(c; c) 2 D , and (iii) there exist (a; b); (c; c); (c; c) 2 D such that a >
b and c > a > c. If a preference %^ on D satises Completeness, Transitivity, Certainty
Monotonicity, Certainty Independence, and Certainty Continuity, then there exists a real
number  such that (a; b) %^ (a0; b0), a+ (1  )b  a0 + (1  )b0.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the case where (a; a) %^ (a; b). By assumption (iii),
c > a. Certainty Monotonicity shows (c; c) ^ (a; a). Then by Certainty Continuity, there
exist  > 0 such that (a; a) ^(a; b)+(1 )(c; c). Denote  a+(1 )c; b+(1 )c
by (a^; b^). 43 Then, (a^; b^) ^ (a; a).
45
a
b^
a^
a
c
D
T
c
b
Figure 5: Indierence curves of %^ on T
Let T be a triangle including the interior which consists of the vertices (c; c), (a; a),
and (a^; b^).44 In the following, we show the existence of the desired real number  on T and
then extend the result on D .
Step 1: T is a nondegenerate subset of D .
Proof of Step 1: Since a > b and  > 0, a^ > b^. Therefore, (a; a) 6= (a^; b^) 6= (c; c).
Hence, T is not degenerate. Choose any (a; b) 2 T to show (a; b) 2 D . Since T is a
triangle, there exist ;  2 [0; 1] such that (a; b) = (c; c) + (a; a) + (1      )(a^; b^) =
( + )(c; c) + (1    )(a^; b^), where c  
+
c+ 
+
a. Since (a^; b^) 2 D , it follows from
assumption (ii) that (a; b) 2 D . 
Step 2: There exists a real number  such that for any (a; b); (a0; b0) 2 T , (a; b) %^ (a0; b0),
a+ (1  )b  a0 + (1  )b0.
Proof of Step 2:
43In the other case where (a; b)%(a; a), there exist  > 0 such that (a; a) ^(a; b) + (1 )(c; c).
Denote
 
c + (1   )a; c + (1   )b by (~a;~b). Then, instead of the triangle T dened in the proof,
consider a triangle including the interior, which consists of the vertices (~c; ~c), (c; c), and (a; a). Then, the
rest of the proof goes through exactly in the same way.
44Formally, T =

(a; b) 2 R2ja  b; 
(a a^; b^ a); (a; b) (a; a)  0; 
(c a^; b^ c); (a; b) (c; c)  0	,
where h; i is a inner product.
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Substep 2.1: For all (a; b) 2 T , there exists a unique number  2 [0; 1] such that
(a; b) ^(c; c) + (1  )(a; a).
Proof of Substep 2.1: Choose any (a; b) 2 T . Since T is the triangle, there exist
;  2 [0; 1] such that (a; b) = (c; c) + (a; a) + (1      )(a^; b^). Since (a^; b^) ^ (a; a),
Transitivity and Certainty Independence show (a; b) ^(c; c)+(1 )(a; a). Since c > a,
Certainty Monotonicity shows that  is unique. Hence, Substep 2.1 is proved.
For all (a; b) 2 T , dene c(a; b) = c+ (1  )a, where  is obtained in Substep 2.1.
Substep 2.2: For all (a; b) 2 T , a  c(a; b)
a  b =
a^  a
a^  b^ .
Proof of Substep 2.2: Choose any (a; b) 2 T . Since c(a; b) = c + (1   )a, a c(a;b)
a b =
a c (1 )a
a b . Since (a; b) 2 T , (a; b) = 0(c; c)+(a; a)+(1 0 )(a^; b^) for some 0;  2
[0; 1]. Since (a; a) ^ (a^; b^), Transitivity and Certainty Independence show (a; b) ^0(c; c)+
(1 0)(a; a). Hence, Substep 2.1 shows 0 = , so that (a; b) = (c; c)+(a; a)+(1  
)(a^; b^). Thus, a c (1 )a = (c+a+(1  )a^) c (1 )a = (1  )(a^ a)
and a  b = (1    )(a^  b^). Hence, a c (1 )a
a b =
a^ a
a^ b^ , so that Substep 2.2 is proved.
Dene  = 1  a^  a

a^  b^ . By substituting this into the result of Substep 2.2, we conclude
that for all (a; b) 2 T , c(a; b) = a + (1   )b. Therefore, for any (a; b); (a0; b0) 2 T
by Substeps 2.1 and 2.2, (a; b) %^ (a0; b0) , (c(a; b); c(a; b)) %^ (c(a0; b0); c(a0; b0)) , c(a; b) 
c(a0; b0), a+ (1  )b  a0 + (1  )b0. 
Step 3: For all (a; b); (a0; b0) 2 D , (a; b) %^ (a0; b0), a+ (1  )b  a0 + (1  )b0.
Proof of Step 3: Let c = 1
2
c+ 1
2
a. Choose any (a; b); (a0; b0) 2 D . Then, by assumption
(i), a  b and a0  b0. Thus, there exists  2 (0; 1] such that (a; b) + (1   )(c; c) and
(a0; b0) + (1  )(c; c) belong to T . Therefore, Step 2 and Certainty Independence show
that (a; b) %^ (a0; b0), (a; b)+(1 )(c; c) %^(a0; b0)+(1 )(c; c), (a+(1 )c)+
(1   )(b + (1   )c)  (a0 + (1   )c) + (1   )(b0 + (1   )c) , a + (1   )b 
a0 + (1  )b0. 
B Proof of Theorem and Proposition 1
The necessity of the conditions is trivial. To show Continuity, note that the EIA model is a
weighted sum of max functions. In the following, we show the suciency. Fix % on (Rn)
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that satises the conditions.
Step 1: There exists a utility function V such that (i) V (p (1  )(x; :::; x)) = V (p) +
(1  )V (x; :::; x) for all p 2 (Rn), x 2 R, and  2 [0; 1]; (ii) V = U on Rn, where U is a
degenerate EIA model.
Proof of Step 1: By Lemma 1, there exists a degenerate EIA model U of % on Rn. As in
Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 1, there exists a utility function V such that for all p 2 (Rn),
x 2 R, and  2 [0; 1], V (p(1 )(x; :::; x)) = V (p)+(1 )V (x; :::; x), so that (i) holds.
In addition, V is unique up to positive ane transformation. Hence, we can normalize V
by V (1; :::; 1) = 1 and V ( 1; :::; 1) =  1, without loss of generality.
To prove (ii), it suces to show that V = U on f(x; :::; x)jx 2 Rg because V is unique up
to positive ane transformation. Since U(x; :::; x) = x for all x 2 R, we prove V (x; :::; x) = x
for all x 2 R. Note that for all x; y 2 R, V (x; :::; x)  V (y; :::; y), (x; :::; x) % (y; :::; y),
x  y. Hence, there exists an increasing function f : R ! R such that V (x; :::; x) = f(x)
for all x 2 R. To show that f is the identity function, note that Dominance trivially
implies (x; :::; x) + (1   )(y; :::; y)  (x; :::; x)  (1   )(y; :::; y) for all x; y 2 R and
 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, property (i) of V shows that f is ane (i.e, f(x + (1   )y) =
f(x) + (1   )f(y)).45 In addition, by the normalizations, f(1) = 1 and f( 1) =  1.
Therefore, f is the identity function. 
If (; ) = 0, then the theorem holds trivially. Thus, we consider the case where (; ) 6=
0. To use Lemma 2, dene D =
 
U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))
 2 R2  p 2 (Rn)	.
Step 2: D satises the properties (i), (ii), and (iii) in Lemma 2.
Proof of Step 2: To show (i), it suces to show that U(Ep(x ))  Ep(U(x)) for all p 2
(Rn). To show this, x p 2 (Rn). For all i 6= 1 and x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn, dene Gi(x ) =
 imaxfxi x1; 0g imaxfx1 xi; 0g. Then, Gi is concave and U(x ) = x1+
P
i6=1Gi(x ) for
all x 2 Rn.46 Since U is a sum of concave functions, U is also concave. Therefore, Jensen's
45To see this x x; y 2 R and  2 [0; 1]. Then f(x) + (1  )f(y) = V (x; :::; x) + (1  )V (y; :::; y) =
V ((x; :::; x) (1  )(y; :::; y)) = V ((x; :::; x) + (1  )(y; :::; y)) = f(x+ (1  )y). Hence, f is ane.
46Remember (i) for any convex function  and positive number a, amaxf(); 0g is convex; (ii) a sum of
convex functions is convex; (iii) for any convex function ,   is concave. By (i), imaxfxi   x1; 0g and
imaxfx1   xi; 0g are convex. Then, by (ii), imaxfxi   x1; 0g + imaxfx1   xi; 0g is convex. Finally,
then by (iii), Gi is concave.
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Inequality shows that U(Ep(x ))  Ep(U(x )) for all p 2 (Rn). Property (ii) follows from
property (9) of U in Lemma 1. To show (iii) assume i > 0 for some i 6= 1 without loss of
generality. Let p = 1
2
(1; (0) i) 12( 1; (0) i). Dene (a; b) = (U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))). Then
a = U(1
2
(1; (0) i) + 12( 1; (0) i)) = 0 >  12(i + i) = 12U(1; (0) i) + 12U( 1; (0) i) = b.
Obviously, there exist c; c 2 R such that c > a and b > c. This completes the proof of
(iii). 
For all (a; b) 2 D , dene v(a; b) = V (p), where p 2 (Rn) such that U(Ep(x )) = a and
Ep(U(x )) = b. Dominance implies that v is a well-dened increasing function.
47 Then, for
all (a; b); (a0; b0) 2 D dene, (a; b) %^ (a0; b0), v(a; b)  v(a0; b0).
Step 3: %^ satises Completeness, Transitivity, Certainty Monotonicity, Certainty Inde-
pendence, and Certainty Continuity.
Proof of Step 3: Since v is a well-dened increasing function, %^ satises Completeness,
Transitivity, and Certainty Monotonicity. Certainty Independence follows from Step 1. To
see this, choose any (a; b); (a0; b0); (z; z) 2 D and  2 [0; 1]. Then, there exist p; q 2 (Rn)
such that (a; b) =
 
U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))

and (a0; b0) =
 
U(Eq(x )); Eq(U(x ))

. To simplify
notation, let p0 = p  (1   )(z; :::; z) and q0 = q  (1   )(z; :::; z). By Step 1(i), then
(a; b) %^ (a0; b0) , V (p)  V (q) , V (p0)  V (q0) ,  U(Ep0(x )); Ep0(U(x )) %^  U(Eq0(x ));
Eq0(U(x ))

. Moreover, since (U(Ep0(x )); Ep0(U(x ))

= (a; b)+(1 )(z; z) and (U(Eq0(x ));
Eq0(U(x ))

= (a0; b0) + (1 )(z; z). This completes the proof of Certainty Independence.
Finally, we show that %^ satises Certainty Continuity. Choose any (a; b); (a0; b0); (z; z) 2
D such that (a; b) %^ (a0; b0) %^ (z; z). Then, there exist p; q 2 (Rn) such that  U(Ep(x ));
Ep(U(x ))

= (a; b) and
 
U(Eq(x )); Eq(U(x ))

= (a0; b0). Then p % q % (z; :::; z). Then by
Continuity, there exists  2 [0; 1] such that q  p  (1   )(z; :::; z). By denition, this
implies that (a0; b0) ^(a; b) + (1  )(z; z). The other case where (z; z) %^ (a0; b0) %^ (a; b) is
proved in the same way. 
Given Steps 2 and 3, Lemmas 2 shows that p% q , V (p)  V (q),  U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))
47To see that v is well-dened (i.e., if (U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))) = (U(Eq(x )); Eq(U(x ))), then V (p) = V (q)),
choose any p; q 2 (Rn) such that (U(Ep(x )); Ep(U(x ))) = (U(Eq(x )); Eq(U(x ))). Then, conditions (i)
and (ii) in Dominance are satised with equality. Therefore, Dominance shows V (p) = V (q).
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%^
 
U(Eq(x )); Eq(U(x ))
, U(Ep(x )) + (1  )Ep(U(x ))  U(Eq(x )) +(1  )Eq(U(x ))
for all p; q 2 (Rn). This completes the proof of Theorem.
In the following, we provide the proof of Proposition 1
Proof : It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). To show that (i) implies (ii), suppose that
(; ; ) and (0; 0; 0) represent %. Let V and V 0 be the function dened by (; ; ) and
(0; 0; 0), respectively.
First, we show (; ) = (0; 0). Suppose to the contrary that (; ) 6= (0; 0). As-
sume 0i > i for some i 6= 1, without loss of generality. Therefore, V (1; (0) i) =  i =
V ( i; :::; i) =  i >  0i = V ( 0i; :::; 0i) and V 0(1; (0) i) =  0i = V 0( 0i; :::; 0i).
Thus, (1; (0) i)  ( i; :::; i)  ( 0i; :::; 0i)  (1; (0) i), which is a contradiction.
Second, we show that if (; ) 6= 0, then  = 0. Suppose to the contrary that (; ) 6= 0
but  6= 0. Without loss of generality, assume  > 0 and i > 0 for some i 6= 1. Then,
V (1
2
(1; (0) i)  12( 1; (0) i)) =  12(1   )(i + i) = V ( 12(1   ) (i + i); :::; 12(1  
) (i+ i)). Therefore,
1
2
(1; (0) i) 12( 1; (0) i)  ( 12(1  ) (i+ i); :::; 12(1  ) (i+
i))  ( 12(1  0)(i + i); :::; 12(1  0)(i + i))  12(1; (0) i) 12( 1; (0) i), which is a
contradiction.
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